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Summary  
 
This paper intends to give an overview of the current position of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in the international security context, identifying NATO’s perspective 
and response on one of the main security threats: the rising of hybrid warfare tactics performed 
by State and non-State actors (NSA). It deepens the hybrid warfare concept, as defined by 
major expert Frank Hoffmann, as academic-technical word, and its actual importance on 
NATO’s strategic and operational course of action. An evaluation on NATO’s tools will lead 
to synthetic and punctual recommendations for the Organization, experts and policy-makers to 
implement and improve NATO’s capabilities 
 
 
Aquest document pretén donar una visió general de la posició actual de l'Organització del 
Tractat de l'Atlàntic Nord (OTAN) en el context de la seguretat internacional, identificant la 
perspectiva i la resposta de l'OTAN en una de les principals amenaces de seguretat: l'augment 
de les tàctiques de guerra híbrides realitzades per l'Estat i no Actors d'estat (NSA). Enfoca el 
concepte de guerra híbrida, tal com el defineix l'expert principal Frank Hoffmann, com a 
paraula acadèmica-tècnica, i la seva importància real sobre el curs d'actuació estratègica i 
operativa de l'OTAN. Una avaluació sobre les eines de l'OTAN donarà lloc a recomanacions 
sintètiques i puntuals per a l'Organització, els experts i els responsables polítics per 
implementar i millorar les capacitats de l'OTAN. 
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Executive Summary  
 
This paper intends to give an overview of the current position of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in the international security context, identifying NATO’s perspective 
and response on one of the main security threats: the rising of hybrid warfare tactics performed 
by State and non-State actors (NSA).  
Adopting major expert Frank Hoffmann’s definition of hybrid warfare as a complex 
coordination of conventional and non-conventional military capabilities, including political, 
economic, diplomatic means, including terrorism, organized crime, cyberattacks, as elements 
operating coherently and simultaneously, creating a powerful synergic effect.  
This policy paper deepens the hybrid warfare topic as academic-technical word, created in a 
Western-centered perspective, how much true or new is the concept and the actual importance 
that the debate on the existence of a new warfare does have on NATO’s strategic and 
operational action.  
As unstructured form of war, hybrid warfare is not only mastered by non-state actors, but also 
by states.  
NATO as political-military organization born in a context of traditional military state-security 
threats, is now facing blurred threats and multi-shape enemies, highly interconnected and 
constantly evolving. To do not get obsolete, NATO needs to reinvent itself, updating its 
perspective and tools beyond the military approach and embracing a multi-dimensional nature 
that can effectively guarantee peace and security for the Alliance.  
The analysis touches upon interaction among the different levels of the international system: a 
supra national level, represented by NATO, a state-one like Russia and transnational like 
terrorist groups. Considering the crisis that sovereign states are living, they are increasingly not 
able to face alone global security issues, which are also more and more interconnected and 
cross-border, fact that foster, or should do, a stronger cooperation among states and therefore, 
stimulating a supranational level of action.  
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NATO represents a strong forum of dialogue, cooperation and action in this troubled moment 
for the West, but often different interests and opinions among the Allies slow down or block a 
powerful unified response to current and future challenges. 
As cases of study, Russia, considered one of the few states which employ effectively hybrid 
warfare, as demonstrated in the Ukraine crisis and the chaos created by the so-called Gerasimov 
Doctrine. In the Middle East, private groups successfully use hybrid warfare to overcome their 
military weakness, bypassing international law, gaining international status. These two actors 
are the emblematic examples of the entrance of the international security environment into a 
hybrid era.  
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 “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon 
those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur."  
Italian air-power theorist Giulio Douhet. 1921.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
  
As policy paper is structured in three main chapter, an introductive chapter about the current 
security environment, an inside look in NATO’s response chapter, divided in strategic and 
operational part, and a third chapter dealing with cases of studies, i.e. Russia and terrorism in 
the Middle East as significative example of state and non-state actors engaging hybrid warfare 
and representing a threat to the Alliance.  
Particularly significant is the NATO’s response chapter, in which NATO strategy is analysed 
in two main aspects: its theorical conceptualization, i.e. NATO coherent vision and perspective 
shape its comprehension and reaction to hybrid threats, and its operational response, i.e. NATO 
concretization of the previous developed strategy, through concrete military tools and 
operations.  
The main objective of the analysis is the study of NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, in its approach to hybrid warfare, as defined by Frank G. Hoffman in “Hybrid 
Warfare and Challenges”. The hybrid warfare is an unstructured form of war, used by States, 
as demonstrate by the high Russian capability, and mastered by non-State actors. The Middle 
East has seen the rise of terrorist groups winning against state military forces thanks to the 
successful use of hybrid warfare, as shown by Hezbollah group in the 2007 Lebanon War.  
Hybrid warfare needs NATO “to be prepared for the unexpected” according to Professor Julian 
Lindley-French’s words, and it requires a different and adapted approach in the strategic and 
operational NATO’s strategy. Considering the above, my work pursues a specific analysis of 
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NATO’s strategies and operational tools to prevent and fight hybrid threats from both State 
and non-State actors.  
A consequent objective of this analysis will be the evaluation of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of NATO’s response to the new hybrid security environments and actors. The 
policy and military evaluation will lead to synthetic and punctual recommendations on the topic 
for the Organization, experts and policy-makers to implement and improve NATO’s 
capabilities.  
The paper intends to answer to the following investigation questions:  
How NATO face hybrid warfare threats from state and non-state actors? 
 Which are NATO’s conceptual approach and instruments against hybrid warfare? Is there a 
difference in its response, related to the different type of actor? How effective is NATO’s 
response to the new security environment?  
To answer, the methodology applied is a qualitative approach, based on an accurate selection 
of policy papers, articles, NATO’s official publications and academic essays. Moreover, the 
paper addresses a specialized audience, as NATO’s experts and academics and policy-makers, 
to whom are especially oriented the final recommendations.    
2. The current hybrid security environment  
 
In 1992 Francis Fukuyama 1said that history had ended: so much happened in the 20th Century 
to leave no space to imagination. And yet, the new century is as full of events as we couldn’t 
expect. The implosion of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (URSS) marked the beginning of 
a period in which the United States of America (US) became the hegemon of the international 
system, configuring an unchallenged supremacy. However, history was not done, and in 2001 
with the 11/9 Twin Towers attack in New York, the West realized a new era started.  
The current international system is much more complex and volatile, new actors and threats, 
in a faster, interconnected and interdependent world. The new multipolar order, resulting from 
                                                          
1 Fukuyama, F. The End of History and The Last Man. New York and London: The Free Press, 1992. Looking 
today at Fukuyama’s perspective on a unipolar world order, where liberal capitalistic democracies establish a 
durable and unchallenged system, highlights instead the deeply unstable and changing nature of the world system, 
in particular, the deep crisis that invested Western liberal democracies, values and identity and the spread of 
populism and nationalist movements, the increasing importance of private and transnational actors.  
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the slow decline of the US as hegemon and the rising of Eastern powers, especially China, 
reflect itself on a new security environment, deeply influenced by advanced technological 
development and globalization. State borders are no longer a barrier as cyber space cannot be 
delimited and transnational crime networks are tangled and worldwide spread. Security threats 
today do not mostly come on tanks and war declarations and the once clear definition between 
war and peace is more and more vague, fact that makes a response, as much political as military, 
complicated.  
The Western security culture in the past Century has been used to traditional military threats, 
based on clear distinctions: enemy-ally, war-peace, foreign-domestic. As analysed by 
Hoffmann in Hybrid Warfare and Challenges2, the US, as the most powerful Western military 
force, has over invested in state-based security threats and traditional war methods, as defined 
by Hoffmann as “myopic preoccupation with conventional war”, while instead, it needs to pay 
more attention to new challenges.  
The current security scenario has dramatically changed, and it keeps evolving rapidly, where 
the agenda is broader, as progressively the concept of security includes new issues, and deeper, 
as new actors, supra-state and sub-state emerge influencing the global agenda. Individuals are 
increasingly acting as security actors: terrorist groups and foreign fighters, transnational crime. 
In the Post-Cold War, state power and sovereignty are being eroded3, still pillars of the 
international system, yet debilitated by the progress made by international law, human rights 
protection and international intervention. The so-called R2P, Responsibility to Protect, still 
controversial in the broader mark of United Nations (UN), has attacked the former absolute 
concept of sovereignty, and contribute to the approach of human security, a new multi-
dimensional, multi-level approach to security, where the individual replaces the state at the 
centre of the system.  
9/11 have had a huge impact on the evaluation of non-state actors as seriously able to pose a 
threat to legitimate states. Non-state actors and failed states, state-backed groups, self-founded 
groups, using new technology and advanced techniques, can effectively engage a full range 
war, as nation-states are developing irregular warfare methods, therefore the categorization of 
state as traditional forces and non-state ones as irregular, is nowadays obsolete.  
                                                          
2 Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. New York. Joint Forces Quarterly 52, First Quarter 2009. 
3 Hirst, Q. P. Another Century of Conflict? War and the International System in the 21st Century. Birbeck 
College, London. 2002. 
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Every Era has its type of war, its instruments and strategies. The 2001 Twin Tower Attack, the 
2006 Lebanon War and the 2014 Ukraine war, have shown a new, intensified, kind of warfare. 
If the Industrial Revolution changed the way of conflict during the last century, today the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RAM4),  is about advanced technology, but not only. In fact, 
the big difference found in the nowadays challenges is the complex fusion of so different 
techniques, actors, instruments. What is been called, Hybrid warfare. As Frank Hoffman says, 
“Hybrid wars are not new, but they are different”. No more one single approach to war, instead, 
the proliferation of several and different methods, instruments, acting synchronized, 
strategically integrated. Western strategists have always had a military-oriented, conventional, 
technical approach to war, consequently, hybrid is a word created by a western perspective, 
responding to a non-Western way to engage war, an “irregular” approach.  
The rise of hybrid threats and warfare needs to be contextualized in the more general changing 
scenario of warfare forms in recent years. As called by William Lind5, in the last decades war 
has evolved in the Fourth Generation, consisting in three core political elements: “The state 
loses its monopoly on war; Fourth Generation warfare is marked by a return to a world of 
cultures, not merely states, in conflict; At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the 
state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation warfare on their soil”.  
 
2.1 Hybrid warfare, a Western perspective  
 
The word hybrid warfare became very much (mis)used in the academic and press context just 
after the Crimea War in 2014, while before it was part of military and strategic academic 
studies.  was being used in academic context already at the beginning of 2000, but just after 
2014 Crimea war it became very much used by the Western press.  
Frank G. Hoffmann represents one of the major experts on War studies and hybrid warfare and 
threats, serving at the National Defence University as a Distinguished Research Fellow with 
the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC.  
Hoffmann’s conceptualization of hybrid warfare is the most accepted in the academic and 
community: “a full range of modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular 
                                                          
4 Hirst, Q. P. Op. Cit. 
5S. Lind. William. Understanding Fourth Generation War. Military Review. September – October 2004. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/lind.pdf  
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tactics and formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and coercion, and 
criminal disorder. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by 
the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the 
main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions 
of conflict (…)”.  
Hybrid threats and warfare analysis are born by looking at the enemy6, Western defence 
planners and experts created the term describing non-Western war behaviour in the recent 
armed conflict, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Chechnya, Ukraine. In particular, the American 
perspective on the rise of hybrid warfare interprets the superiority of the American military 
force as an incentive for non-state actors to develop alternative military and non-military tactics 
to overcome their inferiority. As described in the Joint Operating Environment7 “The continued 
dominance of America’ s armed forces in large-scale force-on-force warfare provides powerful 
incentives for adversaries to employ methods designed to offset our strengths. From non-state 
actors using highly advanced military technology and sophisticated information operations, to 
states employing unconventional technologies, to the improvised explosive devices that pose 
grave threats to our troops, smart adversaries will tailor their strategies and employ their 
capabilities in sophisticated ways.” And more about Western vision in the words of US Army 
Colonel Brown8: “One could argue that hybrid warfare emerged because of the United States 
‘dominance in traditional warfare with a superior technological advantage in sensors, shooters, 
and battle command. The enemy is not stupid and gets a vote on how it will fight against the 
US and its allies.” 
Agreed to the hybrid nature of future conflicts is Russel Glenn9 in the analysis of Second 
Lebanon war in All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War, where he stated 
the superiority of Hezbollah against the Israelite military has been given by the mix of simple 
and sophisticated tactics, the agility of planning and execution, against which the conventional 
state forces have been “futile”. Categorization of war modes, tactics and instruments are useless 
in the modern war analysis because all factors tend to converge and blend together. Hybrid, 
blurred type of war which requires defence planners to go beyond conventional state-based 
war, being prepared and engaging not only military instruments but total wars, which aim to 
be disruptive not only on the battlefield. Hybrid warfare involve a full range of elements, 
                                                          
6 Hoffmann. Op. Cit.  
7 Department of Defence. Joint Operating Environment. Joint Forces Command, February 2010. p.66 
8 Leslie, F., Brown. Twenty-Frist Century Warfare will be Hybrid. US Army College, March 2011, 14 
9 W. Glenn, R. All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War. Santa Monica.  2008. p.73. 
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orchestrated to act in a coordinated, coherent and simultaneous way, creating a powerful 
synergic effect, boosted by use of modern technology.  
Among the challenges posed by hybrid warfare at the operational level, there is the ability to 
keep the battlefield as far as possible from civilian population, fact that has been increasingly 
exploited by terroristic and non-conventional forces during the last decades. Furthermore, the 
use of technology as an informational and learning instrument for this kind of irregular 
combats, who study and acquire new techniques and weapons thanks to the Internet sources.  
Hybrid threats are largely use by non-State armed groups (NSAGs), State or non-State backed, 
represent new influent actors in the security context, revealing themselves powerful and 
dangerous enemies especially in the Middle East and North Africa recent conflicts. Often 
competing with state forces, these groups have developed asymmetrical tactics, based on multi- 
layered activities. As the final objective is not only a win on the battlefield, but often the 
creation of an alternative model of governance, the NSAGs attack the state in a full spectrum 
war: legal conventional- military capacities, political propaganda, but also illegal instruments 
as terrorism, guerrilla, subversion, organized crime and cyber warfare, these are just some of 
the most used elements.  
However, it is not only non-state actors groups engaging hybrid warfare, but also states 
increasingly use hybrid methods to pose indirect threat for strategic aims with the advantage 
of avoiding direct danger of getting into war. In fact, without a recognizable aggression or a 
indentifiable aggressor, as it happens with cyber-attacks, war would be impossible.  
Although traditional and conventional conflict will probably still be the largest part of future 
conflicts, the hybrid approach represents a complicating factor in the defence planning. It 
requires a multi-perspective approach to conflict, more dynamic, flexible and adaptable.  
 
2.2 Hybrid, old war, new word?  
 
As Clausewitz said in his masterpiece “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts 
its characteristics to the given case”10. Beyond the contexts of war, that change over the 
centuries, war maintains its nature, which the military philosopher recognized as three principal 
                                                          
10 Von Clausewitz, C. On War. Princeston. 1832 
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elements: violence, chance and probability and political considerations. If war is always war, 
no matter the circumstances and the modes in which it happens, what does it mean hybrid?  
As on one side the term has become more and more (ab)used in the Western military, academic 
literature and the media in the past decade, on the other side many believe that it is just a 
catchword lacking conceptual clarity. As a concept, hybrid warfare seems to refer to a wide 
range of war tactics, instruments and strategies that do not contain anything especially new. 
According to Damien Van Puyvelde, the over-use of the hybrid word generates confusion and 
ambiguity, instead of clarifying the nature of modern warfare. And as he adds “Any threat can 
be hybrid as long as it is not limited to a single form and dimension of warfare.” 11In his 
analysis, Puyvelde highlights the importance for Western strategists to focus on the complexity 
of modern threats, avoiding simplifying specificity in one sum-up word.  
In accord with Puyvelde on the emptiness of the hybrid concept, Colin Gray argues that future 
wars will basically be the same, considering that since men fought wars, the mix of 
conventional and unconventional means have been always used with the aim of exploiting 
enemies’ weaknesses, therefore the concept of hybrid warfare is nothing new12. Surely, 
innovation in technology, bring up new challenges and ways, as cyber warfare, however, the 
objectives of war itself does not change, besides innovative ways to achieve them.  
Nonetheless, the concept of hybrid warfare is born in Western military strategist and experts 
because of the need to define a non-traditional approach to warfare, coming from non- Western 
powers, which revealed themselves dangerous threats in the last decades, especially in the 2008 
Second Lebanon War and in 2014 Crimea war. The Western approach to warfare has always 
been focused on military force and violence13, consequently the latest evolution of warfare and 
threats towards a convergence of means and instruments, which include aspects of society other 
than the military, as economic and political, found the West quite unprepared. As a result, 
experts started looking for a definition of this changing threats, as the clarification of the 
concept could lead to a better ability to conceive an efficient counter-strategy. In this 
perspective, the concept of hybrid warfare, beyond the discussion of how new or old it is, can 
be useful in the defence analysis and planning.  
                                                          
11 Van Puyvelde, D. Hybrid warfare- Does it even exist? 2015. NATO Review magazine online. 
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/en/index.htm  
12 Gray, C. Another Bloody Century: Future warfare. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005 
 
13 Kitzen, M. Western Military Culture and Counterstrategy: an Ambiguous Reality. Netherlands Defence 
Academy, Department Military Operational Art and Science. 2012. 
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Source: NUPI Policy Brief14 
 
Among the core characteristics of hybrid warfare, the development of non-military 
instruments representing a horizontal escalation15 of coordinated unconventional elements, 
the model16 represented in the image above describe analytically hybrid warfare as 
“asymmetric and multi-modal along a horizontal and a vertical axis, and to varying degrees 
shares an increased emphasis on creativity, ambiguity, and the cognitive elements of war. 
Synchronization and intensity of military and non-military elements, as political, economic, 
civil and informational, are combined by hybrid actors to create a powerful synergetic effect, 
able to attack the enemy on different levels at the same time.  
Therefore, beyond the debate about the derivation of the concept of hybrid warfare, an 
analytical examination of recent, conflicts can lead to a clearer understanding of the set of 
                                                          
14 Reichborn-Kjennerud, E. Cullen, P. NUPI- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Policy Brief, What is 
Hybrid warfare. 2016. 
15 Reichborn-Kjennerud, E. Cullen, P. Ibid.   
16 Reichborn-Kjennerud,  Cullen. Ibid. 
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modern challenges, distinguishing its components and the way they act together, and 
consequently enhance the defence thinking and planning. As the term hybrid came from the 
description of the enemy’ tactics17, experts should take it as an advantage to improve defence 
weaknesses and learn from enemy’s strengths.  
 
2.3 NATO, a 20th century organization in the hybrid Era  
 
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, being the strongest Western Defence 
Organisation is the primer addressee of the new security environment and its challenges. The 
profound changes that have occurred in the International Relations field after URSS collapse 
and the end of the Cold War, led to a slow but constant decline of the West as a political and 
civil power, affected by a deep crisis, its values and identity. A political and identity crisis for 
liberal democracies which blend within a complex and highly instable international context. 
The weakness of sovereign states, their increasing internal fragmentation and external mistrust 
feed the precariousness of the current international system. However, globalization with 
constant and unlimited exchange and interdependence in contemporary societies crushes with 
the increasing nationalist protectionism tendency. Potential adversaries take advantage of the 
globalised context, establishing new and unexpected collaborations, helped by communication 
and technology, media manipulation as form of self-legitimization and discredit for NATO as 
analysed in NATO ACT Report MCCHT18. In this contradicting and complex scenario, it is 
certain that states cannot overcome modern challenges by themselves. The cooperation that 
Western powers have engaged since WWII in the security and defence field is still, and perhaps 
more than ever, essential and necessary for confronting new threats. That is why NATO, its 
updating to the current challenges, which are so different from the ones that NATO was born 
for, and strengthen its capacity to learn and adapt, is essential.   
Despite NATO’s military superiority based on massive military expenditure19, estimated at 936 
billion dollars in 2018, with a rise of 53 billion since 2014, new threats pose a real danger for 
the Allied. The first discussion on the concern of the Alliance regarding hybrid threats and 
warfare emerged at the 2010 Lisbon Summit and in the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept, 
                                                          
17 Hoffmann, F. Op. Cit.  
18 NATO ACT Report - Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (MCCHT), 3-4. August 2010.  
19 NATO- Press Release, Public Diplomacy Division. Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018). 10 
July 2018. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180709_180710-
pr2018-91-en.pdf  
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addressing emerging security threats and its hybrid nature20. NATO members are divided, 
despite an almost general forms of government homogeneity, by different specific security and 
defence issues dealing with geopolitical and geographic reasons, but also resources and power, 
do share values and objectives.  
Since its creation in 1949, the Alliance has guaranteed in the North American and European 
zone a strong, durable and safe peaceful community, establishing its strength in the 
international scenario on military superiority.  
As analysed above, the set of new challenges has deeply changed in the last decades and NATO 
recognizes the necessity to evolve itself, strategically and operationally, to be adaptable and 
agile21. What is sure is that no single state today, no matter how strong it is, can face alone kind 
of threats that are multi-dimensional, transnational, complex and interrelated. 
Ethnic, cultural and social aspects are increasingly important in conflict scenario; therefore, 
NATO strategies and operations are required to improve their ability to work with civilians, 
collaboration with local/regional and international organization, first the United Nations and 
the European Union to achieve a comprehensive approach22 to crisis situations and threats. As 
stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept, p. 14, point 17, “Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix 
of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy”. 
Traditional military forces remain the major Alliance’s strength, however, the key for success 
in confronting hybrid foes is the develop of a new mindset, through investigation and study of 
adversaries’ strategies and capabilities.  
Researchers and strategists 23argue that hybrid threats and warfare go beyond physical 
battlefield towards a “cognitive realm”, i.e. cyber-attacks, high-tech wars that lead to 
“unrestricted warfare24” in which “there are no rules, with nothing forbidden”.25 In an unlimited 
war scenario, where military blend with politics, economics, religion and diplomacy, 
conventional weapon and old deterrence and defence strategy, are not enough. Western 
conventional approach is out-of-date.  
                                                          
20 NATO- Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 2010. Retrieved from 
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf  
21 NATO ACT (MCCHT). Op. cit.  
22 NATO ACT (MCCHT). Op. cit.  
23 Liang, Qiao. Xiangsui, Wang. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing. PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House. 
February 1999.  
24 Liang, Q., Xiangsui, W. Ibid.  
25 Liang Q., Xiangsui, W. Ibid. p.2. 
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In the words of Williamson Murray and Allan Millet26, the formula for success is a military 
culture that embrace innovation. NATO ability to stimulate a culture of innovation and research 
is fostered by its members’ diversity, a favourable key element to mix different military 
cultures and strengths into one powerful multi-faceted strategy.  
 
3. NATO: reinvent to survive 
 
3.1 NATO conceptual and policy strategy  
 
To understand and define the conceptual and policy strategy that NATO adopts, it is necessary 
to deepen the vision of NATO as a multi-governmental organization. A common strategy is 
the result of a complex negotiation of interests, visions, resources and power, fact that 
inevitably affect the results.  
NATO Strategic Concept 27is a strategic and conceptual guide-map for the Organization. In the 
2010 Document, the Allies agree about the changing nature of the current context and features 
of the future security environment, addressing “new emerging challenges”, as international 
terrorism, transnational organized crime, cyber and technological threats and environmental 
emergency.  
However, threats they pose to the Alliance and to the single Members, are described as not as 
dangerous as the one previously faced, i.e. Soviet Union. The new kinds of security threats, 
beyond the military, appear to be underestimated. Instead, the academic analysis, under the 
name of deepening and widening process 28, already integrates non-military issues in the global 
security scenario.  
“Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO 
territory is low. (…) However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored”. 29From this extract, 
it is clear that a real threat is still identified as conventional- military. In the following points 
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of the Concept, nuclear proliferation and other weapons of mass destruction are addressed as 
the most dangerous threats to NATO zone and global security.   
NATO recognizes the existence of new actors and non-military phenomenon that challenges 
the Alliance, however, when it comes to security threat, it is related just to conventional- kinetic 
external issues, as nuclear weapons proliferation in non-NATO zone. Also, in the legal 
framework, Article 5 and collective security concept is linked just to external military threats 
on NATO territories.  
However, hybrid threats, as dealt above, may not come on tanks and missiles, but in a much 
more complex and blurred form, growing inside national borders, inside Western societies. It 
is consequently difficult to establish in which cases Article 5 would be applicable, apart from 
external military aggression, in case for example of cyber-attack30. NATO ability to respond 
effectively and rapidly is a doubt among experts31. A primary problem is that NATO today 
finds itself, as inter-governmental and military organization, projected in a multi-dimensional 
and interrelated network of actors and threats that go beyond military, therefore fall outside its 
mandate, but still need to be managed by NATO to succeed in its main objectives. 
Therefore, NATO needs a new perspective in its strategy, to understand the new challenges at 
first and then innovate its own instruments and capabilities towards a comprehensive 
approach32. As Miklaucic brilliantly points out, “many of the perceived threats (terrorism, 
trans-national crime, violent extremism) are symptoms or consequences of underlying root 
causes (poverty, ethnic strife etc). (…) Whereas treating the symptoms is about preventing 
actions in the shorter term, addressing the root causes of instability is about changing conditions 
in the longer term, which is the fundamental goal of development.”33 
Although treating deep causes of threats is not competence of a military organization, and it 
would require a far more difficult dialogue and consensus in a multi-lateral forum, it is 
increasingly important for NATO to collaborate with non-military organizations and civilians 
to better understand deeper causes while operating on the symptoms34.  
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Collective defence and crisis management 35are fundamental cores on which NATO bases its 
deterrence and defence strategy, however, confronting hybrid threats require the development 
of new capabilities and an extensive approach.  
The Comprehensive Approach 36as conceptual strategy on hybrid threats is still relatively 
undeveloped and generic about “comprehensive activities37”, non-military, involving civil 
society and private sector. The political dimension of the comprehensive strategy is decisive 
while military becomes a support tool; in fact, political and diplomatic instruments need to be 
strengthened by keeping NATO military lead, as hybrid threats operates on different levels, 
among government, society and military force38. “NATO must adapt its capabilities to its 
adversaries and not expect adversaries to adapt to NATO”39, that means the creation of a solid 
strategy of countermeasure against hybrid threats, keeping in mind that political and military 
effectiveness are crucial, as “political decision-making must not take longer than it takes to 
move forces”40. However, finding agreement and fast resolution at the NATO top political 
summit is hard to achieve, unless a situation of extreme gravity occurs, fact that obstructs the 
achievement of a concrete comprehensive approach.  
Hybrid threats and warfare push NATO and its Members to evolve on many aspects, not only 
dealing with NATO approach to exterior foes, but also its internal coherence and solidity. 
Minimizing Alliance’s vulnerabilities needs to be an important part of the comprehensive 
strategy, fighting internal corruption, reinforcing a common shared point of view among the 
Members, all based on a solid combination of “diplomatic, informational, economic and 
military tools (DIME41)”. 
Important aspects for the new NATO security strategy approach have been defined during the 
Wales Summit in 2014, when The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was presented. “In order to 
ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges, 
today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan. It provides a coherent and 
comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security 
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environment on NATO’s borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies” states the 
Wales Summit Declaration42.  
During the Summit, the Alliance recognized new security threats to the Euro-Atlantic space 
coming from two flanks, Eastern ones concerning Russia and South ones, concerning North 
Africa and the Middle East. The RAP contains two new measures especially made to counter 
this kind of threats: Assurance and Adaptation Measures43, both dealing with changes in 
military presence, increased numbers of NATO forces in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Turkey, but also structural changes to military capabilities.  Particularly, Adaptation Measures 
include the implementation of NATO Response Force (NRF)44, with an increased number of 
land, air, sea and special forces and their capability to be deployed in a quick-reaction to attack, 
as guaranteed by the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). 45 Moreover, NATO 
expands its network of multinational headquarters in Eastern Europe Allied territories, already 
settled in Hungary and Slovakia since 2015, NATO Force Integration Units” (NFIUs) are now 
based also in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  
The measures mentioned above adopted by NATO in 2014, demonstrate NATO’s 
consciousness about the evolving security environment and the necessity to enhance its ability 
to react and response quickly, being adaptable and flexible to a full range of threats that leave 
no time to hesitation. 
3.2 NATO operational and military tools 
 
Above it is analysed the creations, main elements and issues of NATO’s strategy about hybrid 
threats. In this section, it will be described how this strategy is concretized in military tools 
and operational programs. 
First, as military organization, NATO concretizes its capabilities in terms of military forces. 
After the Twin Tower Attack in New York in 2001, at Prague Summit in 2002 NATO Heads 
of State and Government decide to step up NATO capabilities and create NATO Response 
Force (NRF) “consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and 
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sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever 
needed”46. NRF is created with the objectives of fast responsiveness to crisis emergency to 
collective defence, therefore covering a great spectrum of challenges and scenarios. To respond 
to different contexts and necessities, the NRF is composed by different operational sections, 
each corresponding to a specific aspect. First, the Rapid Deployable Corps47 set in nine High 
Readiness Headquarters, controlling sixty thousand soldiers considered to be ready within ten 
days to a complete deployment of two months.  
Also, part of the NRF, is the NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF), 48directed and 
coordinated by NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) with its operational centre in 
Mons, Belgium at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). As a powerful 
military operation command, NSHQ include full range of operational aspects “NSHQ is a 
unique hybrid organisation. It is involved in a very diverse set of activities such as SOF-specific 
intelligence, aviation, medical support and communications.”  
The NRF was born as an answer for the 21th Century changing security environment, where 
already in the first years of the new century NATO realized the necessity for a structural change 
in its capacity and means. Fallen the Soviet Union as a conventional military threat especially 
for Easter Europe, during the Prague Summit the Members identified a set of emerging 
unconventional hybrid threats, such as transnational organized-crime and international 
terrorism, which imply for NATO the necessity to start a process of renovation through self-
reflection, "this is not business as usual, but the emergence of a new and modernised NATO, 
fit for the challenges of the new century" as stated by former NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Robertson.49 
The new command structure under the NRF program decentralized its previous base in 
Virginia, United States, to split it and open new command centres in four different areas among 
the US and Europe, all under direct operational and strategic responsibility of the Allied 
Command of Operations (ACO). As the new threats are borderless and spread, NATO new 
command is built with a “global mind-set”50aims for high responsiveness everywhere. 
Moreover, the NRF is totally new in its nature, representing a combined coordinated multi-
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nature of land, maritime, air forces, deployable for any kind of mission, while the old-style 
NATO forces were usually built for specific regions and missions.  
As how innovative and efficient as it appeared, the NRF analysed in 2018, fourteen years later, 
did not mean the expected in the NATO operational innovation process. Used just in “non-
combat operations of limited importance”51, the NRF initial enthusiasm quickly fell in general 
criticism and disappointment52. In fact, lack of political willingness 53and effort caused by a 
deep problem at NATO’s roots, i.e. the different consideration and importance attributed by its 
Members to the Alliance and the consequently different endeavour that each state put in 
NATO’s projects, in short: lack of unified aim and perspective. “In many ways, the NRF 
represents a microcosm of the broader discussions characterising the Alliance”54.  
Especially after the speech of Russian President Putin during the Munich Security Conference 
in February 200755, NATO Members concerns started diverging about where NATO 
capabilities would be need the most: while many European countries felt threatened by Putin’s 
declarations and therefore were calling for “NATO at home”, others, approved the more 
globalized security agenda of NATO’ renovating process, dividing NATO in two factions, “the 
globalizers” and the “Article 5ers”56.  
The divergent perspectives on which objectives, resources57 and use the NRF should have had, 
contributed to weaken the project. Despite being born to innovate NATO operational 
capabilities, the NRF reflected the old Western warfare style, based on military high 
technological superiority, used to interstate armed conflicts; therefore, this focus was at the 
base of the NRF’s conception in 2002. However, when it came to practice, the NRF was 
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deployed for stabilization and reconstruction missions far from home58, making evident that 
the concept, resources and equipment were not adequate to the aim it was created for, the NRF 
needed a review. Between 2008-2009 the NRF was reformed and what it results was a smaller 
restructured 59form of the NRF, which kept its name, with a total personnel number cut to the 
half of the initial assessment.  
As analysed by Lasconjarias, the core word around which the NRF turns is interoperability60, 
meant as a continue process of integration, development and coordination among units, 
services and forces, a high-cost effort to combine not only materials and tools, but also 
approaches, North American and European, to enrich the technical, but also conceptual, NRF’s 
capacity to be a truly useful instrument.  “The work shared between Americans and Europeans 
at all levels- strategic, operational, tactical and technical – make the NRF a true laboratory for 
forging interoperability. 61”  
Despite its initial stalemate, the 2009 renewal and reorganization of the NRF seems to have 
brought positive effects: partnerships with non-NATO countries, like Finland62  are increasing 
and the exchange of knowledge and methods benefits the Alliance’s forces. In fact, despite the 
NRF’s issues63, mostly dealing with military issues, like shortages of forces, and political 
disagreements, it represents also “unique forum of exchange64”. 
Fostering cooperation among European and US forces, exchange of knowledge, techniques and 
technology, to fight new common threats also enhance the now fragile political and diplomatic 
relations within the West, affected by the US’s pivot to the Orient65.  
The creation of the NRF was both an answer and an effect of a security scenario changing, the 
erosion of the Western Allied block and the threatening appearance of new powerful actors, 
weapons, warfare methods. NATO’s recognition of the new situation in the early 2000s led, on 
the operational and technical side, to an overambitious NRF project. The NRF became a 
metaphor of NATO’s usefulness in 20th Century and its capacity to survive. Both new external 
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threats and the pressure of different interests and perspectives coming from inside the Alliance, 
pushed the NRF program expectations, as if its success would represent a broader NATO’s 
reaffirmation of itself. “(…) The debates and disagreements about the NRF are closely 
mirroring the wider discussions about the future of the Atlantic Alliance: overall political 
inclinations are clearly reflected in the positions takes by the allies in the deliberations about 
the response force. (…) This means that the NRF is just as affected by strategic schizophrenia 
as the Alliance in general.”66 
 
4. Cases studies: engaging hybrid warfare  
 
Following a selection of two cases of study, which are emblematic examples of how a State- 
actor such Russia, and a non-State actors as Hezbollah and more in general, terrorist groups, 
engage and develop hybrid tactics in modern conflict. As cases of study, Russia, considered 
one of the few states which employ effectively hybrid warfare, especially cyber warfare. In the 
Middle East, private groups successfully strengthen their military capabilities, bypassing 
international law, gaining international status. The study of these two actors is fundamental to 
understand potential adversaries’ mind-set, and therefore important in the creation of an 
effective counterstrategy for NATO.  
 
4.1 Russia, state actor engaging hybrid warfare 
 
Talking about hybrid warfare during the last decade, it means talking about Russia. Centre of 
debate, analysis and concern among Western foreign policy and defence experts, but not only, 
Russian activities in Eastern Europe grew progressively for intensity and quantity, in what it 
seemed to many a clear attempt to recreate its Soviet sphere of influence, by using conventional 
and non-conventional means67. Russian foreign policy in the last two decades has shown a 
crescendo of aggressiveness against the Eastern Europe neighbours68, starting from “energy 
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cut-off, economic warfare, financial and social destabilization, cyber offensives and more”69 
up to Crimea war and annexation in 2014, which has been addressed as “the most dangerous 
situation in East-West relations since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968”70. 
Military reaction from NATO was expected, but Western political leaders saw Ukraine as the 
political issue and the necessity to avoid “the abyss of military escalation” as declared by 
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, therefore leading to a diplomatic reaction 
in form of economic sanctions.  
Beyond geopolitical and strategic reasons, the Crimea War made the hybrid warfare term 
famous. In fact, before 2014, the term hybrid warfare was used for non-state actors 
asymmetrical fighting tools and techniques, but Russia proved that a state-actor can use 
powerfully a combination of military and non-military means, exploiting the capacity of a 
nation-state to mix soft and hard power, intimidating and deterring without using military force, 
but still being ready to deploy it71.  
Despite Russia progressive strengthen of its military capacity, realized by an almost total 
transformation72 of its armed forces since 2008, its main strength lies in the ability to read the 
moment and combine necessity and opportunity73. Russia did not only boost its armed capacity, 
but also invested in advanced technology, particularly: “web-based information technologies, 
instant mass communications, computer hacking, cyber warfare to damage foreign information 
infrastructure”74. A perfect strategical analysis of maximizing profits and minimizing risks and 
costs, that got unprepared the West and NATO, and opened a concerned debate on the hybrid 
warfare as real threat coming from the old enemy in a new potentiate version75.  
Russian hybrid warfare is not limited to a battlefield, instead it is used as an instrument of 
foreign and security policy 76 rooted in Russian-identity created in opposition to the West, 
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perceived as ideologically opposite and strategically hostile, creating a relation of zero-sum 
security conduct77.  
Despite many discord opinions about how new are the warfare elements used by Russia in the 
Ukraine War, for example The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)concluded in its 
studies of the Crimean operation: “calling it new reflects a failure of imagination, rather than 
novel Russian military capabilities”78, the West and NATO in particular recognize in the 
Russian aggressive and self-assertive posture a real threat 79in old Soviet-style.  
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RAM) concerning Russia is all about technology and the 
vision of the future as no-contact and “control war”, meant as the extension of the military 
battlefield to all the aspects of society through “economic coercion, political subversion and 
the manipulative employment of “information dominance” to weaken and demoralize and 
adversary (…)”80, together with disinformation and information manipulation, guerrilla, 
subversion tactics, were all already elements present in the Soviet warfare style.  
In fact, “hybrid warfare as demonstrated in Ukraine consists of no more than conventional 
warfare coupled with a highly developed disinformation campaign would not indicate anything 
new in Soviet and Russian practice”81. Therefore, it appears that the Russian hybrid warfare 
model does not respond to an actual Russian doctrine nor strategy, instead “hybrid war’ is 
merely a label attributed to Russian actions in Ukraine by the West, in an effort to make sense 
of cascading phases of a security crisis in which all sides but Russia seem to have been caught 
off balance”82. 
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The creation of a “Gerasimov doctrine83”, according to which General Valery Gerasimov, 
Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation would have predicted 84the Russian hybrid 
warfare used during the Ukraine War, has been made by Western scholars and experts, who 
looked for a Russian strategy behind the Crime warfare, used as a demonstration of this alleged 
theory. “The concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ as a description for the approach pursued by Russia 
in Crimea does not originate in Russian military strategic thinking. Instead, it was made 
prominent by Western analysts in the aftermath of the annexation”85. And more, a research on 
Russian language and media coverage for Aleksanteri Papers 86shown that “when Russian 
analysts or journalists today speak or write about ‘hybrid warfare’ [‘gibridnaya voina’] this is 
usually in reference to Western discussions of the issue and often in a dismissive way”87. 
The lecture that Western analysts have given of Crimea War “as evidence of a grander master 
plan of Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ is reminiscent of the West’s enemy image of the Soviet 
Union”88, perhaps endangers the great steps that Western countries, and NATO, as a whole, 
have achieved in the collaboration and partnership in the last decades. Moreover, this 
Manicheist perspective, confuse and distract from a more efficient and focused analysis of the 
Russian capabilities and intentions, to work on an effective counterstrategy.  
The surprise generated by Russian war tactics and methods in Crimea deals with the “contrast 
to the Chechen wars and the war with Georgia, which were fought largely as conventional 
military campaigns relying on heavy and often excessive use of military force”89. In fact, it is 
important to remember that Crimea annexation happened especially thank to a large use of 
military forces.  
It seems that Russia has had a great capacity to learn90 from those previous armed conflicts, 
among many other lessons, the fact that the excess of military forces deployment damaged its 
                                                          
83 Gerasimov, V. ‘Ценность науки в предвидении’ [The Value of Science is in Foresight], Voyenno-
Promyshlennyy Kuryer. February 2013. Retrieved from 
http://vpknews.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf English translation by Robert Coalson and 
commentary by Mark Galeotti, https://in-moscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-
and-russian-non-linear-war  
84 K. Bartles, C. Getting Gerasimov Right. Military Review.January–February 2016. 
85 Renz, B., Smith, H. Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going Beyond the Label. Aleksanteri Papers. Helsinki. 
January 2016.  
86 Renz, B., Smith, H. Ibid. p. 8 
87 Renz, B., Smith, H. Ibid. p. 8  
88 Renz, B., Smith, H. Ibid. p. 9 
89 Renz, B., Smith, H. Ibid. p. 10 
90 W. Grau, L., L. Thomas, T. Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles For Grozny. Marine Corps Gazette, 
April 2000. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/Stefania%20Mascolo/Downloads/2000-04-
01%20Russian%20Lessons%20Learned%20From%20the%20Battles%20For%20Grozny%20(Thomas).pdf  
28 
 
capacity to react fast and efficiently. The ability of self-improvement proved by Russia shown 
its effect in a renovated Russian consciousness and capacity in the Crimea War. However, 
contextualizing the Russian action, gives a more realistic perspective on its actual capabilities, 
which fall in between exaggeration of the threat that Russian capabilities can pose to the West, 
and the underestimation of its strategical and operational development.   
In fact, “For countries like Ukraine, hybrid warfare is a tangible threat, but for most European 
states it poses less of a danger. Such tactics worked so well in parts of eastern Ukraine because 
it is hard to imagine a more favourable ground: a contested, passive or near-absent sense of 
Ukrainian identity, estrangement from the new authorities in Kiev, a large-scale Russian 
military and intelligence presence in Sevastopol, and the domination of Russia-based media 
outlets. Due to this climate, for it was not just easy for Russia; it was almost effortless.”91 
Beyond the actual novelty of Russian hybrid warfare style in Crimea, what matters is the fact 
that as state-actor Russia has been able to efficiently deploy and coordinate a mix of 
conventional and unconventional, previously considered a non-state actors peculiarity. In fact, 
“the conflict shown the Russian leadership’s ability to co-ordinate all relevant instruments of 
state power, including special operations forces, information operations including state media, 
elements of cyber warfare, deterrence and coercion through staged military exercises and the 
use of proxy fighters, for the successful achievement of objective”.92 Including a modernised 
and efficient Russian military forces, for size, abilities, and resources, included the creation of 
Special Operation Forces (SOF), as high responsiveness troops.    
Russian demonstration of strategical and operational ability is a wake-up call for the West to 
keep-up with the evolving challenges.   
 
4.2 Terrorist groups: non-state actors hybrid warfare  
 
NATO’s engagement in world security is nowadays focused on the Eastern and Southern 
flanks. A Baltic area threatened by Russian aggressive foreign policy on Eastern Europe, and 
on the South, the Middle East. As analysed above, Russia represents a peculiar state-actor with 
the ability to successfully engage hybrid warfare tactics. However, the hybrid warfare was 
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traditionally referred to non-state actors, in fact the term was used93 in 2005 to describe the 
raising of non-conventional, irregular warfare coming from private group actors, who were 
developing new threatening tactics to obviate their conventional military force capacity.  
Among all the terrorist organizations that in the last decades threatened the global security and 
represented a powerful adversary and threat in the Middle East and created concern in the West, 
Hezbollah is a very interesting case of study. “Before Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. in 
September 2001, Western intelligence services recognised Hezbollah as one of the most 
dangerous and capable terrorist groups in the world”94.  As private group, state-backed by Iran, 
and extensively integrated in the Lebanon parliamentary system, Hezbollah represents the 
capacity of a non-state actor to not only posing a threat to a sovereign state, but defeating it on 
the battlefield by using hybrid warfare tactics.  
In fact, one year later Hoffman’s article, during the 2006 Lebanon War, the Hezbollah group 
successfully used mixed conventional and unconventional warfare against the Israeli Defence 
Forces (IDF), which lead to a bitter defeat for a powerful state force: an alarming signal for 
NATO and Western powers. “Hezbollah clearly demonstrates the ability of nonstate actors to 
study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities of Western style militaries, and devise appropriate 
countermeasures95”. 
And more, “Hezbollah affirms an emerging trend. Highly disciplined, well trained, distributed 
cells can contest modern conventional forces with an admixture of guerrilla tactics and 
technology in densely packed urban centres”96. 
 The rise of irregular hybrid warfare, especially in non-state actor, like terrorist groups, appears 
to be caused by at least two factors: globalization and the enormous American conventional 
military strength.  
“Our (American) conventional superiority creates a compelling logic for states and non-state 
actors to move out of the traditional mode of war and seek some niche capability or some 
unexpected combination of technologies and tactics to gain an advantage. Thus, we need to 
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explore the nature of alternative challenges and the corresponding investments we must make 
to better posture ourselves for a projected world of more unconventional adversaries.”97 
Moreover, “Irregular warfare is a natural reaction to globalization and America’s 
overwhelming military superiority. Having raised its own way of war to its apotheosis, the 
United States has turned future opponents to alternative means that are purposely designed and 
deployed to thwart conventionally oriented Western societies”.98 
NATO’s approach to counterterrorism changed after the 9/11 Attacks, embracing international 
terrorism as a global security threat, requiring a specific set of strategical and operational tools. 
In the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept99 terrorism was specifically addressed as a direct threat 
to the Alliance security. “(…) an “across the board” approach to fighting terrorist networks 
becomes both sensible and necessary. (…) Defining NATO’s own role in countering terrorism 
becomes a compelling need.”100 
The evolution of the terrorist threat in the last decades involves a more complex and 
sophisticated, interconnected and trans-national form of terrorism, including: “the established 
connection between terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, and international organized 
crime; the emergence of homegrown terrorists and “lone wolves”; reliance on complex funding 
mechanisms; use of sophisticated propaganda; and access to advanced technologies and 
fascination with unconventional high-impact operations”101, while borders become blurred and 
tactics mixed and unconventional and highly technological.  
This is especially true for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a terrorist group who grown 
rapidly in few years, developing a very sophisticated hybrid warfare tactics, based on a well-
calibrated and organized blur of several tactics and instruments: from guerrilla, to “highly 
mobile standoff engagement systems”, terrorism, use of cyber propaganda and information 
warfare, collaboration with other organized crime groups. 102 
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98 Hoffman, F. Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs. Orbis, Summer 2006. p. 
397 
99 NATO Strategic Concept – Op. Cit.  
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In particular, information warfare and cyber propaganda, as the most recognizable non-
conventional hybrid warfare tools, have been brilliantly mastered by ISIS. “ISIS produced 
videos depicted ruthless military tactics, brutal mass executions and gory punishments to incite 
fear, often broadcast on Twitter. (…) During a single summer month, ISIS produced nearly 
900 pieces of Arab-language propaganda and nearly half focused on quality of life issues such 
food, utilities and schools in the attempt to portray a utopian view of life under the caliphate. 
In the same year, ISIS decided to not just exploit the internet for propaganda purposes but use 
it as a weapon.” 
A profitable connection and collaboration among terrorist groups and international crime, like 
drug-trafficking, from different part of the world, create an intricate network of financial 
mutual assistance and advantage. “Among the others, these activities and connections give 
terrorists wider autonomy, making them less dependent on “external” support from sponsor 
nations, reducing the reach and leverage of any international response”.103 
For NATO, as political-military organization born for well-defined State-against-State type of 
threats, the current evolving security environment is a real challenge, especially because “the 
incidence, nature, scope, and, above all, perception of the threat posed by terrorists vary 
enormously among countries and regions”.104 Based on the concept of collective security, 
ensured by Article 5, the Alliance needs to recognize a specific common external threat in order 
to function.  
Despite many initiative and programs adopted after 2001, like the “Military Concept for 
Defence against Terrorism, a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T), five nuclear, 
biological, and chemical defence initiatives, protection of civilian populations including a 
Civil-Emergency Planning Action Plan. (…) The creation of the Defence e Against Terrorism 
(DAT) Program of Work (POW) to improve the response to new security challenges posed by 
asymmetric threats. And an Intelligence-sharing was enhanced including through the 
establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit”.105  
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As stated during the Comprehensive Political Guidance at the Riga Summit in November 2006 
106“terrorism . . . and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal 
threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years”. 
NATO’s activities for counterterrorism focus on share knowledge and capabilities among the 
Members, with mutual support, but also a stronger collaboration with the United Nations as a 
forum for International Law107, legal reference and commitment, and with the European Union, 
with a new consideration and dialogue with civil society and other local organization.  
“Traditional deterrence, based on the threat of retaliation, is not suited for use against non-state 
groups as they have little to strike back at. There is, however, scope to push back by 
undermining their support and restricting their actions — including their propaganda, military, 
terrorist and financial operations.”108 
Moreover, “Non-state actors such as terrorist groups generally do not have targetable assets, 
and for a non-state actor to tolerate the status quo would be to accept defeat. Highly ideological 
groups do not change their beliefs in response to physical pressure. Furthermore, the terrorist 
aim is generally to provoke the state into overreaction, so terrorist groups often welcome 
attacks by states as this strengthens their support. So, deterrence against non-state groups is 
difficult”.109 
What is clear for NATO about its counterterrorism capacity is the necessity to go beyond the 
military means, embracing a more multi-dimensional approach, involving new level of the 
society, that deal with globalization, digital propaganda, Internet and social networks, and 
structural issues in Western societies that foment social fractures, as one of the causes of 
modern terrorism.  
5. Policy Implications  
 
Resulting from the above analysis is a struggling NATO, but still main reference for the West. 
NATO identifies the new challenging security environment, new threats and characteristics, 
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but it seems to have difficulties in a rapid effective adaptation, often holding on to a closed-
minded military focus, despite some attempt to embrace a more comprehensive approach.  
From a conceptual point of view, NATO’s strategy as defined in the 2010 Strategic Concept 
identifies major threats to the Alliance as traditional-military, as mass destruction weapon, 
while addressing new non-only military threats as terrorism, transnational organized crime, 
climate change. However, as this kind of threats fall out of the Article 5 collective defence rule, 
it seems much harder for the Alliance to effectively engage action. Political decision on the 
proposed Comprehensive Approach, which would lead the Alliance to a more multi-level and 
multi-dimensional organization, has revealed the major problem. In fact, at political level, 
different threat perceptions and political interests impede the creation of a clear and solid 
strategy with a common support.  
At the operational level, the Strategic Concept recognizes the necessity to develop new forms 
of non-military actions, as crisis management and peace-keeping, also with a new stronger 
dialogue and collaboration with local authorities and civil populations during operations, 
however the actual capacity to embrace it was weak. The NRF program resized for objectives 
and financial means, has shown deep fractures inside the Alliance, uncapable to keep a unified 
effort.  
The analysis shows NATO conscious of the rapidly evolving set of threats, trying to keep up 
with modernity, but afflicted by internal disagreement and often a myopic point of view.  
 
 
 
5.1 Recommendations  
 
1. Cooperation is a good deterrent. Partnerships and cooperation with the EU and UN 
have already been mentioned by NATO, however, it implementation should be 
tighter. A more structured collaboration among the three organization regarding 
hybrid threats, particularly the ones dealing with technologies, cyber-attacks first, 
would make a unified response much stronger and effective.  
2. Comprehensive Strategy. Conceived but still undeveloped, a comprehensive 
approach is necessary to reinvent NATO as a multi-dimensional organization, 
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giving a renovated importance to political and societal aspects, like online 
propaganda, disinformation, fake news and events manipulations, all elements that 
are brilliantly used by new opponents.  
3. A firm aim is worth thousand weapons. The rise in the military expenditure does 
not mean a better defence when the objective pursued is unclear or different in the 
same Alliance. Unity of intents among the Allied about who are the enemies and 
how to fight them, is the strongest port of departure for any strategy.  
4. Research. Implementing research, both technical and strategical, is a crucial factor 
to acknowledge adversaries’ thoughts, strategies and tools. The research should 
never rest, as today the world evolves rapidly, NATO need to be a step ahead and 
not waiting for threats to manifest.   
5. Forward-looking. Using the same mid-set to face the present makes NATO 
obsolete, comparing to its enemies. A perspective oriented to the future is the only 
way to keep NATO’s strength.  
6. Do not rest on your laurels. Military superiority was earlier a deterrent for all kind 
of enemies. Hybrid warfare, technology and globalization today allow even small 
groups to be a threat to the Alliance. It is important to not overestimate military 
superiority as the only necessary winning card.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
As a result of the analysis, it appears that the instruments, strategical and operational, that 
NATO developed and used to adapt to the changing security environment in the last two 
decades have been sometimes just sketched, like the Comprehensive Strategy, sometimes 
fragile and overestimated, like the NRF. Furthermore, it results that the lack of common 
interests and perspectives at the internal level of the Alliance, affected its performance in terms 
of strategies, resource, and credibility.  
Likewise, often NATO’s experts and policy-makers are victims of old dichotomic West-
against-East visions, as demonstrated by the creation of a phantom Gerasimov Doctrine, which 
affect negatively NATO’s capacity to understand and interact in a multipolar world.  
The paper highlights important forward moves that NATO achieved facing the hybrid era, but 
also provide recommendations to boost NATO’s capacity to keep its primary role as global 
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security keeper, first recovering its unit of intents among the Alliance and then proceeding to 
reinvent and adapt itself to a new set of threats.  
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